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Abstract  
 
Among neurotypical adults, errors made with high confidence (i.e., errors a person strongly believed 
they would not make) are corrected more reliably than errors made with low confidence.  This 
“hypercorrection effect” is thought to result from enhanced attention to information that reflects a 
“metacognitive mismatch” between one’s beliefs and reality.  In Experiment 1, we employed a 
standard measure of this effect.  Participants answered general knowledge questions and provided 
confidence judgements about how likely each answer was to be correct, after which feedback was 
given.  Finally, participants were retested on all questions answered incorrectly during the initial 
phase.   Mindreading ability and ASD-like traits were measured.  We found that a representative 
sample of (n = 83) neurotypical participants made accurate confidence judgements (reflecting good 
metacognition) and showed the hypercorrection effect.  Mindreading ability was associated with 
ASD-like traits and metacognition.  However, the hypercorrection effect was non-significantly 
associated with mindreading or ASD-like traits.  In Experiment 2, 11 children with ASD and 11 
matched comparison participants completed the hypercorrection task.  Although ASD children 
showed significantly diminished metacognitive ability, they showed an undiminished hypercorrection 
effect.  The evidence in favour of an undiminished hypercorrection effect (null result) was moderate, 
according to Bayesian analysis (Bayes factor = 0.21).  
  
3 
 
Metacognitive monitoring and the hypercorrection effect in autism and the general population: 
Relation to autism(-like) traits and mindreading 
 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder diagnosed on the basis of severe 
impairments in social-communication, as well as a restricted and repetitive repertoire of behaviour 
and interests (American Psychological Association, 2013).  At the cognitive level, ASD is 
characterised by a diminished ability to attribute mental states to others in order to explain and predict 
their behaviour (henceforth termed mindreading; also known as theory of mind).  Moreover, the 
extent of mindreading ability/impairment has been shown in some studies to predict the severity of 
ASD features in those diagnosed with the disorder (see Brunsdon & Happé,  2014) and the number of 
ASD-like traits in the general population (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001).  Despite extensive research on mindreading in ASD over the past three decades, very 
little research has investigated the extent to which individuals with this disorder are able to represent 
their own mental states accurately (so-called “metacognition” or metacognitive monitoring; see 
Williams, 2010).   This is surprising given many researchers suggest metacognitive monitoring is 
thought to rely on the same metarepresentational ability as mindreading (e.g., Carruthers, 2009, Frith 
& Happé, 1999), so might be expected to be as impaired as mindreading in ASD and equally 
predictive of ASD features.  Furthermore, metacognitive monitoring ability is known to be involved 
in self-regulated learning and to predict learning/educational outcomes independent of general 
intelligence in the neurotypical population (e.g., Hartwig & Dunlowsky, 2012; Veenman et al., 2005).  
Thus, a diminution of metacognitive monitoring ability in ASD might well contribute to well-
documented educational under-achievement that is seen even among intellectually-able individuals 
with ASD (e.g., Jones et al., 2008; Estes, Rivera, Bryan, Cali, & Dawson, 2011).   
What relatively little research has been conducted on metacognitive monitoring accuracy in 
ASD appears to indicate a deficit, although not conclusively so.  Children with ASD have well-
established difficulties with “self-versions” of classic mindreading tasks (see Williams, 2010), as well 
as in real-world learning situations (Brosnan et al., 2016), that require the attribution of mental states 
to self in order to explain one’s own behaviour.  Furthermore, adults with ASD report high levels of 
alexithymia, a difficulty identifying and labelling one’s own emotional states (e.g., Griffin, 
Lombardo, & Auyeung, 2015).  However, it is arguable whether or not these paradigms really 
measure the accuracy with which one can monitor online one’s own current mental states (see 
Carruthers, 2009; but see Williams, 2010).  Recently, studies of ASD have begun to employ classic 
paradigms from the field of metacognition that require participants to make explicit online judgements 
about the state of their own cognition.  In these paradigms, participants perform a cognitive task (e.g., 
answering general knowledge questions) and are asked to make judgements about the accuracy of 
4 
 
their responses/knowledge.  “Object-level” performance (i.e., cognitive ability) is indicated by the 
accuracy of task responses (e.g. the number of general knowledge questions answered correctly, 
reflecting semantic knowledge).  “Meta-level” performance (i.e., meta-cognitive monitoring ability) is 
indicated by the extent of correspondence between a participant’s judgement of performance and their 
actual performance (usually established by gamma correlations; Goodman & Kruskal, 1954).  One 
metacognitive judgement widely investigated in the neurotypical population is a judgement of 
confidence (JOC).  In a JOC task, participants often answer general knowledge questions and, 
immediately after answering a question, are asked to make a judgement about the likelihood that their 
answer is correct.  Higher confidence in correct answers than incorrect answers (a positive gamma) 
indicates that a person is accurately monitoring their own state of knowledge.  Five studies have 
explored the accuracy of JOC in children with ASD, three of which have observed diminished 
accuracy relative to comparison participants (Grainger et al., 2016; McMahon et al., 2016; Wilkinson 
et al. 2010; but see Sawyer et al., 2013, and Wojcik et al., 2011) 
One effect studied in relation to JOC accuracy (but which has never been explored in ASD) is 
the “hypercorrection effect”.  When young neurotypical adults (e.g., Butterfield & Mangels, 2006) 
and children (Metcalfe & Finn, 2012) report high confidence in answers that turn out to be incorrect, 
their memory for the correct answer is subsequently enhanced, suggesting that monitoring of one’s 
confidence mediates learning.   In the typical paradigm, participants answer general knowledge 
questions and, immediately after answering each question, are asked to make a judgement about the 
likelihood that their answer is correct (just as in a standard JOC task).  After each confidence 
judgement has been made, participants are presented with the correct answer to the question.  After all 
trials have been completed, participants are retested on all the questions that they answered incorrectly 
during the initial test phase.  During this retest phase, participants are significantly more likely to 
answer questions correctly if the answer they provided to that question in the initial test phase had 
been made with high confidence than if it had been made with low confidence.  This finding is 
remarkably robust and has been found reliably in young adults and children from the age of around 
six years of age (Butler, Fazio, & Marsh, 2011; Butterfield, & Metcalfe, 2001, 2006; Butterfield & 
Mangels, 2003; Eich, Stern, & Metcalfe, 2013; Fazio, & Marsh, 2009, 2010; Iwaki, Matsushima, & 
Kodaira, 2013; Metcalfe, & Finn, 2011, 2012; Metcalfe, & Miele, 2014; Metcalfe, Butterfield, 
Habeck, & Stern, 2012; Sitzman, Rhodes, & Tauber, 2014; Sitzman, Rhodes, Tauber, & Liceralde, 
2015). 
An influential explanation for the hypercorrection effect is that participants experience 
surprise at being wrong when they did not expect to be wrong, and subsequently allocate attentional 
resources preferentially to encode the correct answer more effectively than answers that they did not 
expect to be correct during the initial phase (Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2006; Butterfield and Mangels, 
2003; Fazio & Marsh, 2009; Metcalfe & Finn, 2011).   In other words, corrective feedback following 
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a high confidence error produces a “metacognitive mismatch” (e.g., Metcalfe, Butterfield, Habeck, & 
Stern, 2012) between one’s belief about reality and reality itself.  Becoming aware of this mismatch 
(i.e., of one’s own false beliefs) is a phenomenally salient experience that results in deeper processing 
of the stimuli about which one held a false belief, according to this explanation.  The possibility that 
the hypercorrection effect reflects metacognitive processes is supported indirectly by the finding (by 
Metcalfe et al., 2012) that corrective feedback to high-confidence, but not low-confidence, errors 
selectively elicits activation of the right temporo-parietal junction (as well as dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex). Crucially, the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is a brain region widely implicated in mental 
state reasoning and metarepresentation of others’ thoughts (see Shurz et al., 2014).   
However, it may be that the hypercorrection effect reflects a cognitive, rather than (or in 
addition to) a metacognitive, process.  The fact that a metacognitive mismatch (between one’s belief 
about reality and reality itself) enhances learning does not show that the cause of the hypercorrection 
effect is itself metacognitive, and the above evidence for the involvement of metacognition in 
producing this effect is only indirect.  Instead, the hypercorrection effect may reflect, at least partly, 
the detection of a mismatch between the generated response and the subsequent feedback. At the time 
of receiving feedback, participants will of course be aware of what answer they just gave, and whether 
they reported high- or low-confidence in this answer. A high-confidence error may thus still elicit a 
salient mismatch that triggers attentional orienting and enhanced encoding of the correct answer, but 
the locus of the mismatch may be between the corrective feedback and a representation of the 
preceding response in short-term memory, rather than a mismatch between corrective feedback and a 
metacognitive representation of one’s previously held false-belief (for a discussion of this issue, see 
Williams & Happé, 2009).    
Whether or not the hypercorrection effect reflects metacognitive or cognitive processes, it is 
important to investigate it in relation to ASD, given the potential implications it has for educational 
practice.  To date, no study has investigated the hypercorrection effect in ASD.  If children with ASD 
show a normal hypercorrection effect, then it might prove a useful learning strategy for teachers to 
encourage children to make confidence judgements before they receive feedback.  However, while 
neurotypical children (from middle childhood onwards, at least) show a normal hypercorrection 
effect, it is not clear that children with ASD will.  The reaction of children with ASD to a 
metacognitive mismatch may be atypical and so attentional resources may not be rallied to encode the 
correct answers to high confidence errors more effectively than correct answers to low confidence 
errors.  If the hypercorrection effect does rely on metarepresentational resources, then we should 
expect the effect to be reduced in ASD (given well-known metarepresentational difficulties in this 
disorder).  However, if the hypercorrection effect merely represents the detection of mismatch at the 
cognitive level, then the effect may be undiminished in ASD.  In Experiment 2, we address the issue 
(among others) of whether children with ASD display a typical hypercorrection effect.  Before this, 
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however, Experiment 1 addresses the issues concerning the nature of the hypercorrection effect, and 
whether judgment of confidence accuracy (metacognitive monitoring ability) relates to this effect, or 
to mindreading or ASD-like traits.  The results of this first experiment inform predictions for 
Experiment 2.  
In Experiment 1, we investigated JOC accuracy and the hypercorrection effect using the 
standard task described above.  Eighty-three neurotypical adults completed this task, as well as 
widely-used measures of mindreading (the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task; RMIE; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001) and ASD-like traits (the Autism-spectrum Quotient; AQ; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b).  Experiment 1 had several related aims.   
First, we aimed to assess the extent to which objectively-measured metacognitive monitoring 
ability (JOC accuracy) is associated with mindreading ability.  This is the subject of a theoretical 
dispute between those who argue that metacognitive monitoring depends on the same 
metarepresentational resources as mindreading (e.g., Carruthers, 2012), and those who claim that 
metacognitive monitoring and mindreading rely on entirely different processes (e.g., Nichols & Stich, 
2003).  Mindreading clearly relies on metarepresentation, so if either JOC accuracy or the 
hypercorrection effect are metarepresentational, then they should be associated with performance on a 
measure of mindreading ability (in this case the RMIE task).    
Second, we aimed to establish the extent to which metacognitive monitoring ability is 
associated with the number of self-reported ASD-like traits.  It is well-established that mindreading 
ability is (negatively) associated with ASD-like traits in the general population (e.g., Baron-Cohen et 
al. 2001b), but no study to our knowledge has assessed the possible relation between metacognitive 
monitoring and ASD-like traits, despite suggestions that diminished metacognitive monitoring might 
contribute to some of the core features of ASD itself (Williams, 2010).   
 
Experiment 1: Method 
Participants 
Eighty-three undergraduate students (72 female) from the University of Kent, UK took part in the 
experiment.  The average age of participants was 20.49 (SD = 4.96; range = 18 to 44) years.  No 
participant had a history of psychiatric disorder, including ASD, according to self-report. All 
participants gave informed consent and received course credit in partial fulfilment of their degree, for 
taking part in the study. The study (comprising experiments 1 and 2) was ethically approved by Kent 
School Psychology Research Ethics Committee. 
Materials and procedures 
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Hypercorrection Task. Stimuli for the hypercorrection task were 150 general knowledge 
questions (e.g., “What is the largest planet in the solar system?”), taken from Nelson and Narens’ set 
of published questions (Nelson & Narens, 1980), and general knowledge trivia websites.  Correct 
answers to these questions were always a single word (e.g., “Jupiter”). Questions were presented in a 
fixed random order for each participant. 
The procedure for the hypercorrection task consisted of an initial test phase, and an 
unexpected retest phase.  The procedure used was based closely on the typical method used to assess 
the hypercorrection effect in the literature (see e.g., Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2006; Metcalfe, 
Butterfield, Habeck & Stern, 2012). During the initial test, participants were individually presented 
with each of the general knowledge questions on a laptop screen, and were given an unlimited amount 
of time to provide an answer. Participants were told that if they did not know the answer to the 
questions they should take a guess. For each question, after participants had provided an answer, a 
confidence scale appeared below the question and their given answer. This consisted of a sliding 
scale, ranging from ‘Not Confident’ (0) to ‘Confident’ (100).  Participants were instructed to drag the 
marker left or right with a mouse to make a confidence rating.   
Immediately after providing a confidence rating, participants were provided with feedback 
and were shown the correct answer to the question on the screen for three seconds.  It was explained 
to participants that if the correct answer matched the answer participants had given, feedback would 
appear in green in the centre of the screen. In contrast, if the correct answer did not match the 
participant’s response, the correct answer appeared in red in the centre of the screen. A letter –
matching algorithm was used to score participants responses as either correct or incorrect 
automatically. This algorithm calculated the Jaro-Winkler distance between participant’s response and 
the correct answer, and did not take into account differences in capital letter use (e.g., “Jupiter” was 
consider the same as “jupiter” or “JUPITER”). Answers that had a Jaro-Winkler distance ≥.80 were 
considered correct, whilst answers with a Jaro-Winkler distance ≤ .79 were considered incorrect. Pilot 
work indicated that this algorithm classified response correctly on almost all occasions. On the very 
rare occasion that the letter-matching algorithm misclassified a response as incorrect/correct the 
experimenter verbally corrected the feedback. Before completing the initial test phase, participants 
complete 5 practice trials.  
After participants had completed the initial test phase of the task, they were given a surprise 
retest. It was explained to participants that they would now be retested on the questions that they had 
answered incorrectly during the initial test stage. During the retest phase, participants were presented 
with each of the questions they had answered incorrectly again and were asked to provide an answer. 
Participants did not have to rate their confidence during the retest phase and were not given feedback 
on whether their answers were correct.  
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Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task.   The RMIE task is a widely used measure of 
mindreading in clinical and non-clinical populations. Participants were presented with a series of 36 
photographs of the eye-region of the face.  On each trial, participants were asked to pick one word 
from a selection of four to indicate what the person in the picture was thinking or feeling.  Participants 
were instructed to read all four words carefully before they made a response. If participants felt more 
than one of the words was applicable, they were instructed to select the word that they thought was 
most suitable. Before beginning the task, participants completed a practise trial. Stimuli were 
presented on screen to participants in a random order, and no time limit was imposed. 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient. All participants completed the AQ, a self-report questionnaire 
that assesses ASD/ASD-like features, and is considered a reliable measure of ASD traits in both 
clinical and subclinical populations. The AQ presents participants individual statements (e.g., “I find 
it difficult to imagine what it would be like to be someone else”) and participants were asked to 
decide the extent to which the agreed with each statement, responding on a 4-point Likert scale, 
ranging from “definitely agree” to “definitely disagree”.   
Scoring 
Hypercorrection Task.  
Object-level performance (basic general knowledge) ability was calculated as the proportion of 
questions participants answered correctly in the initial test phase of the task.  
Metacognitive monitoring performance (judgement of confidence accuracy) was established 
using gamma correlations, which are a non-parametric measure of the strength of association 
(Goodman & Kruskal, 1954).  Gamma is used in the majority of studies of metacognitive monitoring 
(and all studies of JOC accuracy within studies of the hypercorrection effect) (see Nelson, 1984).  A 
gamma score was obtained for each participant, allowing the association between correctness of each 
answer during the initial test phase and confidence level in the answer given.  A gamma score of +1 
indicates a perfect correspondence between confidence in the accuracy of answers and actual accuracy 
of those answers (i.e., a person knows perfectly when they know and do not know).  A gamma of zero 
indicates no association between confidence and answer accuracy (i.e., random judgements).     
The hypercorrection effect was measured by calculating a gamma correlation for each 
participant between confidence assigned to incorrect answers during the initial test and correctness of 
answer during the retest phase (i.e., whether or not the initial error was corrected at retest). In this 
case, a gamma of +1 would indicate that initial confidence perfectly predicted retest performance (the 
higher the confidence in the original error, the more likely it was to be corrected at retest).   A gamma 
of zero indicates no association between initial confidence and likelihood of error correction (i.e., 
random corrections). This approach to scoring is employed in the majority of studies of the 
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hypercorrection effect [Butler et al (2011), Butterfield and Metcalfe (2001, 2006), Eich et al. (2013), 
Fazio and Marsh (2009, 2010); Iwaki et al. (2013); Metcalfe and Finn (2011, 2012), Metcalfe and 
Miele (2014); Metcalfe et al. (2012), Sitzman et al. (2014), and Sitzman et al. (2015)]. 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RMIE) Task. Scores on the RMIE task range from a 
possible 0-36, with higher scores indicating better performance on the task. 
Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ). Scores on the AQ range from 0-50, with higher scores 
indicating more self-reported ASD-like traits. A score of ≥26 is considered as potentially clinically 
significant and expected for a person with a diagnosis of ASD (see Woodbury-Smith, Robinson, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2005).   
  
Statistical analysis 
An alpha level of .05 was used to determine statistical significance, unless experimental effects were 
specifically predicted.  If effects were predicted, then significance values are reported for one-tailed 
tests.  Where ANOVAs were used, we report partial eta squared (𝜂𝑝
2) values as measures of effect size 
(≥ .01 = small effect, ≥ .06 = moderate effect, ≥. 14 = large effect; Cohen, 1969).  Where t-tests were 
used, we report Cohen’s d values as measures of effect size (≥.0.20 = small effect, ≥ 0.50 = moderate 
effect; ≥ 0.80 = large effect; Cohen, 1969).   
 
Experiment 1: Results 
The average AQ total score across participants was 16.08 (SD = 6.20; range = 4 to 29), which is non-
significantly different from the general population average of 16.40 (SD = 6.30) reported by Baron-
Cohen et al. (2001b), t(82) = 0.46, p = .64, d = 0.05.   The average score on the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes task was 25.56 (SD = 3.93; range = 4 to 29), which is non-significantly different from the 
general population average of 26.20 (SD = 3.60) reported by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001a), t(82) = 1.45, 
p = .14, d = 0.19.  These analyses suggest that the current sample is highly representative of the 
general population with respect to self-reported ASD-like traits and objectively-measured 
mindreading ability.   
Descriptive statistics for variables associated with performance on the experimental 
metacognition/hypercorrection task are shown in Table 1.  Participants were highly accurate in their 
judgements of confidence, producing an average JOC gamma that was significantly above zero, t(82) 
= 137.04, p < .001.   Likewise, participants showed the expected hypercorrection effect, producing an 
average hypercorrection gamma that was significantly above zero, t(82) = 8.34, p < .001.1  Moreover, 
the size of the hypercorrection gamma in the current study (.25) was non-significantly different to the 
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average hypercorrection gamma found across all previous studies of this effect among young 
neurotypical adults [mean gamma across 24 experiments/independent samples = .27; Butler et al 
(2011), Butterfield and Metcalfe (2001, 2006), Eich et al. (2013), Fazio and Marsh (2009, 2010); 
Iwaki et al. (2013); Metcalfe and Finn (2011, 2012), Metcalfe and Miele (2014); Metcalfe et al. 
(2012), Sitzman et al. (2014), and Sitzman et al. (2015)], t(82) = 0.59, p = .55, d = 0.09. 
Association analyses 
A series of correlation analyses was conducted exploring the relations among performance on 
the experimental metacognition/hypercorrection task, the RMIE task, and the AQ.   As predicted, JOC 
gamma was also positively and significantly associated with RMIE, reflecting an association between 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy and mindreading abilities, r =.25, p = .01 (one-tailed).  The 
correlation between JOC gamma and the hypercorrection effect gamma was also positive and 
significant, r = .32, p = .003.  However, the hypercorrection effect gamma was negatively and non-
significantly associated with the RMIE, r = -.16, p = .88.  A Fisher’s Z test revealed that the JOC 
gamma × RMIE correlation was significantly larger than the hypercorrection effect gamma × RMIE 
correlation, Z = 2.64, p = .008.   
These results appear to suggest that the variance shared between JOC gamma and 
hypercorrection effect gamma does not overlap with the variance shared between JOC gamma and 
RMIE score.  To investigate these results further, a series of partial correlations was conducted.  The 
JOC gamma × RMIE score, controlling for hypercorrection effect gamma, remained significant and 
increased slightly in magnitude relative to the bivariate correlation, r =.27, p < .01 (one-tailed).  
Similarly, the JOC gamma × hypercorrection effect gamma, controlling for RMIE score, remained 
significant and increased slightly in magnitude relative to the bivariate correlation, r =.34, p < .002.  
Finally, the hypercorrection effect gamma × RMIE score, controlling for JOC gamma, remained 
negative and non-significant, r = -.11, p = .35.  These analyses confirm that the association between 
JOC gamma and hypercorrection effect gamma has a different underlying basis to the association 
between JOC gamma and RMIE score.  Finally, a partial JOC gamma × RMIE correlation, controlling 
for the proportion of questions answered correctly during the initial test phase (i.e., general semantic 
knowledge) and the hypercorrection effect gamma, remained significant, r =.23, p < .02 (one-tailed).  
This final analysis highlights that the variance shared uniquely between JOC gamma and RMIE score 
reflected metacogitive/metarepresentational, rather than cognitive/representational, processes.  
Next, the relations with AQ were explored.    As expected on the basis of previous research, 
performance on the RMIE task was found to be significantly associated with AQ, r = -.35, p < .001.  
However, the hypercorrection effect gamma was non-significantly associated with AQ, r =.08, p = 
.45.  Moreover, the JOC gamma × AQ score correlation was non-significant also, r = -.10, p = .36, 
suggesting that (unlike mindreading ability) objectively-measured metacognitive monitoring ability is 
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not reliably associated with ASD-like traits.  To establish the extent to which variance shared between 
JOC gamma and RMIE is predictive of AQ score, two partial correlations were conducted to establish 
the extent to which the variance shared between the two is predictive of AQ score.  The JOC gamma 
× AQ score correlation, controlling for RMIE score, remained non-significant and reduced in 
magnitude relative to the bivariate correlation, r = -.02, p = .88.  In contrast, the RMIE × AQ score 
correlation, controlling for JOC gamma, remained highly significant, r = -.33, p = .002.  Thus, what 
little association there was between JOC accuracy and AQ score was explained almost entirely by a 
common factor shared with mindreading ability.  Furthermore, a Fisher’s Z test confirmed that the 
partial RMIE × AQ correlation was significantly larger than the JOC gamma × AQ correlation, Z = 
2.02, p = .04. 
Experiment 1: Discussion 
The current sample was representative of the population in terms of overall level of performance on 
widely-used measures of mindreading and ASD-like traits.  Moreover, the size of the hypercorrection 
gamma was also representative among the current sample.  This is important, because it increases 
confidence that the observed associations between key dependent variables are also reliable.  
 The first notable set of findings was that JOC gamma was associated significantly both with 
the hypercorrection effect and with mindreading ability (the RMIE task score).  However, the 
hypercorrection gamma was not, itself, associated with RMIE score.  These results suggest that 
metacognitive monitoring (as indexed by JOC gamma) relies to some extent on metarepresentation 
(hence the association with a putative metarepresentational task, the RMIE task).  However, the 
variance shared between the hypercorrection effect and JOC accuracy does not reflect a shared 
reliance on metarepresentation.  Rather, it seems that the overlap between JOC accuracy and the 
hypercorrection effect is due to a non-metarepresentational aspect/component of metacognitive 
monitoring (see Figure 1 for an illustration).  This was confirmed by the partial correlation analyses, 
in which the relation between JOC gamma and RMIE was even stronger after controlling for the 
hypercorrection effect gamma, and (correspondingly) the relation between JOC gamma and 
hypercorrection effect gamma was even stronger after controlling for RMIE score.   
The second notable set of findings was that, while RMIE task performance was significantly 
associated with AQ score (poorer mindreading = more ASD-like traits), neither JOC accuracy nor the 
hypercorrection effect were predictive of AQ score.  The small amount of variance in AQ score 
explained by JOC accuracy was purely the result of shared variance with mindreading ability.  This 
suggests that, although metacognitive monitoring and mindreading are themselves related, ASD-like 
traits are related to difficulties in representing others’ mental states, rather than one’s own.    
However, it is not always possible/accurate to extrapolate data from studies of ASD-like traits in the 
general population and apply it to individuals with a full diagnosis of ASD.  Although, there is 
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arguably continuity between ASD-like behavioural traits in the population and ASD features in 
diagnosed cases (e.g., Frazier et al., 2014), there may also be qualitative differences in the cognitive 
mechanisms that underpin those traits in each population (e.g., Peterson et al., 2005).  Thus, in our 
Experiment 2 we addressed these issues in a sample of children with ASD and neurotypical 
comparison children.  Participants completed an age-appropriate version of the experimental 
hypercorrection task used in Experiment 1, which required them to answer general knowledge 
questions, provide confidence judgements about each answer, receive feedback on the accuracy of 
their answer, and then be retested on every initially incorrect answer.   
Given that JOC accuracy is associated significantly with mindreading ability (the latter being 
known to be impaired in ASD), it was predicted that participants with ASD would show a significant 
diminution in JOC accuracy (in line with some previous findings;  Grainger et al., 2016; McMahon et 
al., 2016; Wilkinson et al. 2010), as a result of diminished metarepresentational ability.  Making 
predictions about between-group differences in the hypercorrection effect is less straightforward.  The 
significant association between the JOC gamma and the hypercorrection gamma might lead to the 
prediction that both will be impaired in ASD, given that the two share variance.  However, this shared 
variance is not underpinned by metarepresentational ability, it seems.  Rather, the hypercorrection 
effect does not seem to rely on metarepresentation, unlike judgements of confidence.  As such, the 
prediction that both JOC accuracy and the hypercorrection effect will be diminished in ASD relies on 
the assumption that the non-metarepresentational component of both is impaired in ASD.  This may 
be the case.  However, our central prediction (based on background theory; Carruthers, 2009) in the 
current study was that only metarepresentational aspects of the experimental task would be 
diminished in ASD.  For this reason, we predicted that the hypercorrection effect would be 
undiminished in ASD.  Nonetheless, given the uncertainties in making predictions, all p values 
regarding the hypecorrection effect were reported two-tailed to reflect a non-directional hypothesis. 
 
Experiment 2: Method 
Participants 
Baseline characteristics for ASD and comparison participants are displayed in Table 2.  All 
participants with ASD had verified diagnoses made according to DSM-IV-TR criteria.  Verbal IQ and 
Performance IQ were estimated using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for Intelligence-II (Wechsler, 
1999).  The parents of ASD and comparison participants completed the Social Responsiveness Scale, 
a valid and reliable measure of ASD features (Constantino & Gruber, 2001).  There were no 
significant between-group differences in age, verbal IQ, or performance IQ (all ps >.17, all ds < 0.47).  
The between-group difference in SRS score was highly significant, p < .001, d = 1.75. 
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Materials, procedures, and scoring 
The experimental hypercorrection task had exactly the same structure, procedure, and scoring method 
as that used in Experiment 1, but used different (age-appropriate) stimuli.  Three sets of general 
knowledge questions were used. Each set consisted of 50 questions, taken from Nelson and Narens’ 
published set (Nelson & Narens, 1980) and from general knowledge trivia websites. Each set of 
questions varied in difficulty, and were designed to test the general knowledge of children aged 7-8 
years (Set 1), 9-11 years (Set 2) and 12-14 years (Set 3). Given the age range of children that 
participated in the study, this ensured that the questions in the task would always range in difficulty. 
This design maximised variation in the confidence ratings assigned to answers (including incorrect 
answers), and avoided floor or ceiling effects in object-level performance.  The decision surrounding 
which set of questions to give to each child was based on chronological age. However, on the very 
few occasions when a child’s verbal abilities were well above or below average, the question set was 
determined by mental age to minimise the risk of floor or ceiling effects.  Answers to questions in all 
sets were a single word. Questions were presented in a fixed random order for each participant.  
Experiment 2: Results 
Descriptive statistics for variables associated with performance on the experimental 
metacognition/hypercorrection task are shown in Table 3.   
Object-level performance 
Object-level performance was assessed using a mixed 2 (Group: ASD/comparison) x 2 (Test period: 
initial test/retest) ANOVA on the proportion of questions answered correctly.  This revealed a 
significant main effect of Test period, reflecting significantly superior performance at retest than at 
initial test, F(1, 20) = 10.91, p = .004, 𝜂𝑝
2= .35.  The main effect of Group was also significant, 
reflecting superior semantic knowledge among comparison participants than ASD participants overall, 
F(1, 20) = 5.04, p = .04, 𝜂𝑝
2= .20.  However, there was no Group × Test period interaction, showing 
that participants with and without ASD showed the same pattern of performance across test periods, 
F(1, 20) =  0.21, p = .65, 𝜂𝑝
2= .01. 
Judgements of Confidence and the Hypercorrection Effect 
The between-group difference in average confidence ratings given to answers during the initial test 
phase was non-significant, t(14.10) = 0.52, p = .61, d = 0.22.  JOC accuracy (gamma) was 
significantly above zero in each group, ts ≥ 14.33, ps ≤ .001 (one-tailed).  However, as predicted, JOC 
gamma was significantly lower among participants with ASD than comparison participants, t(20) = 
2.00, p = .03 (one-tailed), d = 0.86.  This between-group difference is very similar in magnitude to the 
average between-group difference in JOC accuracy across the five previous studies among children 
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with ASD [Mean Cohen’s d = 0.81; Grainger et al., (2016); McMahon et al., (2015); Sawyer et al., 
(2013, Exps 1 & 2); Wilkinson et al. (2010; Exp. 1); Wojcik et al. (2011)]2.  Finally, the 
hypercorrection effect gamma was significantly above zero in each group, ts ≥ 2.28, ps ≤ .023.  
Despite showing a substantial diminution of JOC accuracy, participants with ASD nonetheless 
showed a slightly (but non-significantly) larger hypercorrection effect than did comparison 
participants, t(20) = 0.57, p = .58, d = 0.25.   
To put these key results in context, participants with ASD performed 1.02 SDs below the 
comparison group mean for JOC accuracy, but 0.24 SDs above the comparison group mean for the 
hypercorrection effect, on average.  This difference is highly significant, indicating that, relative to the 
performance of comparison participants, the performance of participants with ASD was significantly 
poorer with respect to JOC accuracy than with respect to the hypercorrection effect, t(10) = 3.01, p = 
.01. 
Given the potential for making type II errors when sample sizes are small, we conducted a 
further analysis of the between-group difference in the hypercorrection gamma.  An increasingly-used 
approach to interpreting null results is to calculate a Bayes factor associated with the critical contrast 
of interest.  Bayes factors overcome the limitations of interpreting p values when power is relatively 
low by providing an estimation of the relative strength of a finding for one theory over another theory, 
which allows a more graded interpretation of the data (e.g., Rouder et al., 2009).  Thus, they provide 
an estimate of the degree to which findings are supportive of the null hypothesis over the alternative 
hypotheses (Dienes, 2014).  According to Jeffreys’ (1961) criteria for interpreting Bayes factors, 
values of > 3 provide evidence for the alternative hypothesis, whereas values < 1 (or ≤ 0.33, according 
to Diennes, 2014) provide evidence for the null hypothesis.  Bayes factors between 1 and 3 provide 
inconsistent evidence for either hypothesis.  We calculated a Bayes factor (using Dienes, 2008) for the 
critical between-group difference in the hypercorrection gamma (mean difference between groups = -
.12; SE of the difference = .20), assuming the difference would be associated with an effect size of 
0.604.  This calculation produced a Bayes factor of 0.21, which indicates moderate evidence for the 
null hypothesis5.   
Finally, a series of exploratory correlation analyses was conducted to explore the extent to 
which performance on the experimental metacognition/hypercorrection task was associated with ASD 
features (SRS total score).  Among ASD participants, the JOC gamma × SRS correlation was 
moderate-to-large, but non-significant, r = -.43, p = .18.  The hypercorrection effect gamma × SRS 
correlation was also moderate, but non-significant, r = -.31, p = .35.  Among comparison participants, 
correlations were small and non-significant (JOC gamma × SRS: r = -.10, p = .80; hypercorrection 
effect gamma × SRS: r = .13, p = .74). 
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Experiment 2: Discussion 
As expected, JOC accuracy was found to be diminished among this sample of children with ASD.  
The between-group difference in the size of JOC gamma was significant and large (d = 0.86).  In 
contrast, the hypercorrection effect was slightly (but non-significantly) larger among ASD than 
comparison participants.  Results indicated that the between-group difference in JOC accuracy was 
significantly larger than the between-group difference in the hypercorrection effect.  Finally, a 
Bayesian analysis of the between-group difference in the hypercorrection effect suggested the data 
provided moderate evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. 
 
General discussion 
The aims of the current study were to investigate metacognitive monitoring ability, and its relation to 
ASD features/ASD-like traits and mindreading ability.  We also aimed to investigate the 
hypercorrection effect.  In Experiment 1, we found that JOC accuracy–an established indicator of 
metacognitive monitoring ability–was associated significantly with performance on the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes task, which is a widely-employed measure of mindreading ability.   To our 
knowledge, this is the first study of the relation between metacognitive judgement accuracy and 
mindreading among neurotypical individuals, and the results are important from a theoretical 
perspective.  Although previous studies have attempted to address the potential link between 
metacognition and mindreading among individuals with a formal diagnosis of ASD, those studies 
have lacked the statistical power required to detect the predicted effect (see Grainger et al., 2014).  
This is common in ASD research, in which samples tend to be relatively small, given the difficulties 
recruiting and testing participants with this disorder.  By exploring this issue in relation to ASD-like 
traits and mindreading ability measured as continuous variables among a large sample of neurotypical 
adults, we were able to overcome this problem.    The significant association between JOC accuracy 
and performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task in Experiment 1 was not substantial (r = 
.25; r = .27 after controlling for hypercorrection effect gamma), but this was expected.  Theoretical 
claims that metacognitive monitoring depends on the same neuro-cognitive mechanism as 
mindreading (e.g., Carruthers, 2012; Frith & Happe, 1999; Williams, 2010) do not imply that the two 
abilities are synonymous or that they are entirely overlapping.  Rather, the suggestion is merely that 
metacognitive monitoring relies to some extent on the same inferential capacity/metarepresentational 
resources as does mindreading, rather than being an entirely non-inferential, non-metarepresentational 
process.  There are other non-shared resources required for successful mindreading and metacognitive 
monitoring, respectively; executive functioning, for example, is probably implicated to a greater 
degree in mindreading performance than metacognitive monitoring performance (Roebers, Cimeli, 
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Roethlisberger, & Neuenschwander, 2012).   As such, the finding that the mindreading and 
metacognitive abilities are related, but not perfectly/substantially so, is in keeping with predictions.   
As expected, we also found that mindreading ability was associated significantly with ASD-
like traits; the lower an individual’s mindreading ability, the higher their ASD-like traits tended to be.  
However, JOC accuracy was not significantly associated with ASD-like traits in Experiment 1.  This 
suggests that it is primarily the use of metarepresentational resources to represent others’ mental 
states, rather than one’s own mental states, which contributes to ASD-like traits in the general 
population.  
Overall, the results from Experiment 1 were complemented by those from Experiment 2.  In 
Experiment 2, we found diminished JOC accuracy, but an undiminished hypercorrection effect, 
among children with a formal diagnosis of ASD.   The finding of diminished JOC accuracy in ASD 
adds to recent findings that children with ASD have difficulty making this kind of metacognitive 
judgement (Grainger et al., 2016; McMahon et al., 2016; Wilkinson et al. 2010; but see Sawyer et al., 
2013) and supports the idea that children with ASD have diminished metacognitive monitoring ability 
alongside diminished mindreading ability.    
In the current study, despite showing diminished JOC accuracy, children with ASD 
nonetheless showed an undiminished hypercorrection effect (e.g. Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2006). 
Likewise, in Experiment 1, whereas JOC accuracy correlated with mindreading ability, the 
hypercorrection effect did not. Although a prominent theoretical framework suggests that the 
hypercorrection effect is caused by metacognitive mismatch detection (e.g. Butterfield, et al. 2012), 
our findings suggest that this effect may not be strongly dependent on metarepresentational ability, 
but rather may be mediated by more basic cognitive processes. Of course, it is important to stress that 
the results concerning the hypercorrection effect in Experiment 2 need to be considered with some 
caution, given the small sample involved, and await replication before strong conclusions can be 
drawn.  However, the data itself provided moderate evidence that this effect is undiminished in ASD.   
This is the first study of the hypercorrection effect in ASD and suggests that children with this 
disorder would benefit from making explicit confidence judgements about the state of their own 
knowledge when learning new information.  Corrective feedback to high confidence errors selectively 
enhances learning and so could help children with ASD to learn information more effectively, even if 
the judgements of confidence are not themselves as accurate as those made by neurotypical children.   
Interestingly, the pattern of performance observed in children with ASD in Experiment 2 is 
the opposite to that observed among older neurotypical adults.  Eich et al. (2013) found that, relative 
to young adults, older adults showed a significantly diminished hypercorrection effect despite 
undiminished JOC accuracy.  Although the findings from Experiment 2 with regard to the 
hypercorrection effect are preliminary, they suggest a different pattern of strengths and difficulties in 
17 
 
this domain among people with ASD compared to older neurotypical adults.   This is particularly 
interesting, given recent comparisons between cognitive/memory impairments in ASD and cognitive 
decline in older age (e.g., Bowler, 2007; Ring, Gaigg, & Bowler, 2016), and suggest that this 
comparison may not be appropriate in all respects.   
In sum, the current study provides further evidence of metacognitive monitoring deficits in 
ASD, but also of typical hypercorrection of high confidence errors in children with this disorder.  
Future research might usefully take a developmental/longitudinal approach to these issues to establish 
whether metacognitive monitoring deficits resolve over time in ASD.  Moreover, it would be 
beneficial to know whether individuals with ASD base their same sources of information (or 
“mnemonic cues”) as neurotypical individuals do.  The investigation of metacognition in ASD is at a 
relatively early stage, so many questions remain unanswered.  The current research helps narrow 
down the questions that need to be asked by confirming that metacognitive monitoring deficits are 
present in children, as well as by clarifying the relation between monitoring ability and ASD traits, 
and the nature of the hypercorrection effect.  
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Footnotes 
1. No differences between males and females were apparent in terms of either JOC gamma, t(81) = 
0.76, p = .45, d = 0.25 or the hypercorrection effect gamma, t(81) = 0.32, p = .75, d = 0.11.
 Moreover, there were no between-sex differences in any of the bivariate correlations reported 
in Experiment 1 (all Zs ≤ 0.93, all ps ≥ .35).  
 
2. Wilkinson et al., (2010) did not use gamma to establish JOC accuracy.  The effect size is based on 
between-group differences in the proportion of items correctly recognised (old/new recognition) that 
participants were certain they had got correct (see table 2 of Wilkinson et al., p.1375).  Wojcik et al., 
(2011) did not use gamma to establish JOC accuracy.  The effect size is based on the average 
difference in JOC accuracy (as established using “non-directional discrepancy method”) across the 
three conditions of Wojcik et al.’s experimental task. 
 
3. In the only other study of the hypercorrection effect in children, Metcalfe and Finn (2012) reported 
an average hypercorrection gamma of .21 across three experiments involving children aged 
approximately 8 to 12 years.  The hypercorrection effect gammas in the current study were larger than 
this, but non-significantly so, among participants with ASD, t(10) = 1.80, p = .10, and comparison 
participants, t(10) = 0.90, p = .39. 
 
4. This effect size estimate was based on the difference in the size of the hypercorrection effect 
between younger and older adults in the study by Eich et al. (2013).  Given that the memory/cognitive 
profile of older adults has been compared to that characteristically observed in ASD (see Discussion 
section; e.g., Bowler, 2007), we considered that any between-group difference in the size of the 
hypercorrection effect in the current study might be of a similar magnitude to that observed by Eich et 
al.   
 
5. An alternative to basing an effect size estimate on existing literature is to specify the “minimally 
interesting value” that would support a particular hypothesis (e.g., Dienes, 2014).  That is, one can ask 
what size a between-group difference in task performance would have to be for it to be 
meaningful/clinically-relevant.  In our view, any between-group difference in task performance 
should be associated with an effect size that is at least moderate (i.e., 0.50). Any difference that is 
only small in magnitude is not clearly clinically relevant, in our view. Therefore, we recalculated the 
Bayes factor for the predicted between-group difference in the size of the hypercorrection effect, but 
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assumed that the difference would be associated with an effect size of 0.50, rather than 0.60. Under 
this conservative assumption, the Bayes factor was 0.25, which still represents moderate evidence in 
favour of the null hypothesis. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for performance on the experimental metacognition/hypercorrection 
task in Experiment 1 
Variable Mean (SD) 
Initial test phase  
Proportion of correct answers  .52 (.15) 
Mean confidence rating for all answers 49.22 (15.40) 
Judgement of confidence accuracy (gamma) .86 (.06) 
Retest phase  
Proportion of correct answers on re-test test .74 (.15) 
Hypercorrection effect (gamma) .25 (.28) 
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Table 2: Baseline characteristics of ASD and comparison participants in Experiment 2 
 ASD (n = 11; 10 male) Comparison (n = 11; 8 male) 
Age 9.86 (1.69) 9.86 (1.00) 
VIQ 98.91 (15.34) 104.82 (9.94) 
PIQ 104.55 (14.51) 109.91 (14.34) 
SRS 78.73 (9.40) 53.44 (18.11) 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for performance on the experimental metacognition/hypercorrection 
task among ASD and comparison participants in Experiment 2 
Variable ASD  Comparison 
Initial test phase   
Proportion of correct answers  .54 (.14) .65 (.11) 
Mean confidence rating for all answers 66.94 (22.71) 70.84 (10.51) 
Accuracy of confidence judgements (gamma) .74 (.17)  .86 (.12) 
Retest phase   
Proportion of correct answers on re-test test .62 (.21) .76 (.10) 
Hypercorrection effect (gamma) .47 (.47) .35 (.50) 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the relations among JOC accuracy, RMIE, and the hypercorrection effect in 
Experiment 1. 
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